British Society for Phenomenology
Menu

Next Talk of “Monthly Phenomenology”: Lorenza D’Angelo (Pompeu Fabra University)

D’Angelo on Pleasure, Pain and Introspection. 6 March 2026 – Online. Organized on behalf of the Network for Phenomenological Research

MONTHLY PHENOMENOLOGY
An online forum of discussion on recent work in phenomenology

Description: This series of talks gathers together scholars interested in phenomenology and its relation to contemporary issues in philosophy, especially in the philosophy of mind. It establishes a forum of discussion where people can meet on a regular basis and present their work-in-progress or recent publications. The topics addressed will stretch from the history of early phenomenology to the systematic application of phenomenological insights in recent debates in analytic philosophy.

Schedule: The talks will take place once a month on a Friday from October to May. Time: 10:15am ET, 3:15pm GMT/GMT+1, 4:15pm CET. Talks last 90 minutes, including a 45 minutes Q&A.

Participation: Talks are held on zoom. To participate, please send an email to hamid.taieb@hu-berlin.de with the heading “Registration Monthly Phenomenology”. A zoom link will be sent to you the day preceding each talk.

Programme:

Next talk

Lorenza D’Angelo (Pompeu Fabra University)

Pleasure, Pain and Introspection

Friday, 6 March 2026
10:15am ET, 3:15pm GMT, 4:15pm CET

Abstract: This talk advances a phenomenological account of the nature of pleasure and pain. In §1, I ask whether there are any experiential features unifying all pleasure and all pain, and, if so, whether we can introspect them. In §2, I defend the view that any pleasure is such in virtue of the fact that it feels good (it has a conscious positive valence) while any suffering is such in virtue of the fact that it feels bad (it has a conscious negative valence). In §3, I argue that these experiential features are non-sensory. My argument draws on recent work in the philosophy of mind: I first explain what conditions must be met in order for a mental feature to count as sensory, and I then show that valence does not meet these conditions. In §4, I draw some conclusions concerning introspection.

Upcoming talks

Mohammed Saleh Zarepour (University of Manchester)
The Flying Man and the Transparency of (Self-)Knowledge
3 April 2026

Sebastian Watzl (University of Oslo)
Attention Norms and Frames. On the Social Organisation of Experience
8 May 2026

Convenors:
Guillaume Fréchette (University of Geneva)
Marta Jorba (Pompeu Fabra University)
Alessandro Salice (University College Cork)
Hamid Taieb (Humboldt University Berlin)
Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran (Philipps University Marburg)

Organized on behalf of the Network for Phenomenological Research