Patrick Eldridge – Intersubjectivity in episodic memory: Phenomenology and the conditions for joint remembering
The Bochum-Grenoble-Taipei Memory Colloquium – Zoom Talk, 18 December 2025.
Patrick Eldridge – Intersubjectivity in episodic memory: Phenomenology and the conditions for joint remembering
The Bochum-Grenoble-Taipei Memory Colloquium announces the talk “Intersubjectivity in episodic memory: Phenomenology and the conditions for joint remembering” by Patrick Eldridge (University of New Brunswick) on Thursday, December 18th (12:15/19:15 Taiwan time).
Please join the meeting on Zoom (http://www.zoom.us) with the details below. Registration is not necessary.
link: https://univ-grenoble-alpes-fr.zoom.us/j/98859063721?pwd=6Xx6tmUpCSaSD4BkF4bPGhrxSuca5t.1
meeting ID: 988 5906 3721
password: 302355
Abstract: For the past decade, authors influenced by classical phenomenology have been inserting themselves into debates in social ontology, collective intentionality, and theories of joint cognition and emotion. (Zahavi, Moran, Szanto, Caminada, Salice, Overgaard, et al.) To start, I extract some of the salient features of this literature for an account of the type of ‘togetherness’ that individual episodic rememberers might achieve when they jointly reminisce, and define it further by positioning it relative to accounts of joint mental time travel (Michaelian && Sutton) and some aspects of collective memory literature. (Halbwachs, Olick, Landsberg, Hirsch) However, after reviewing some of the basic features of phenomenological approaches to individual episodic memory (like the type of metacognition called ‘time-consciousness’), we see that episodic remembering faces some serious obstacles to ‘togetherness’ that, say, shared emotions or collaborative actions do not. To make a start on overcoming these problems, I offer an account of the intersubjective status of episodic memories and the pervasive impact that the awareness of other minds has upon the individual’s relationship to their own episodic memories, and argue that this allows for ‘joinable’ (if not joint) remembering. By carefully considering a case of the awareness of someone else’s memories, and the impact this has upon one’s own, I delineate the intentional architecture involved in making room for others in one’s own episodic memory. This runs counter to some statements by Ricoeur and is more fine-grained than Casey’s account of reminiscing.
This virtual colloquium series focuses on topics in the philosophy of memory and related philosophical areas but also reaches out to philosophically interested researchers in the cognitive sciences. The colloquium is organized by the Ruhr University Bochum (Markus Werning and Jonathan Najenson), the Centre for Philosophy of Memory at Université Grenoble Alpes (Kourken Michaelian and Denis Perrin), and the Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition at National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University (Ying-Tung Lin and Chris McCarroll).
You can find the schedule for upcoming talks below:
22.1.2026 Tania Casimiro (University of Stirling)
5.2.2026 Dylan Trigg (Central European University)
For the full program, including titles and abstracts of the talks, see the colloquium webpage: https://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/phil-lang/MemoryColloquium.html