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Next Talk of “Monthly Phenomenology”: Andrew Butler (Boston University)

Title: ‘Husserl on Perceiving Universals: Cognitive Penetration and Non-Conceptualism’ – Friday, 13 November 2026. From the Network for Phenomenological Research.

MONTHLY PHENOMENOLOGY
An online forum of discussion on recent work in phenomenology

Description: This series of talks gathers together scholars interested in phenomenology and its relation to contemporary issues in philosophy, especially in the philosophy of mind. It establishes a forum of discussion where people can meet on a regular basis and present their work-in-progress or recent publications. The topics addressed will stretch from the history of early phenomenology to the systematic application of phenomenological insights in recent debates in analytic philosophy.

Schedule: The talks will take place once a month on a Friday from October to May. Time: 4:15pm CET, 3:15pm GMT/GMT+1, 10:15am ET. Talks last 90 minutes, including a 45 minutes Q&A.

Participation: Talks are held on zoom. To participate, please send an email to hamid.taieb@hu-berlin.de with the heading “Registration Monthly Phenomenology”. A zoom link will be sent to you the day preceding each talk.

Programme:

Next talk

Andrew Butler (Boston University)

Husserl on Perceiving Universals: Cognitive Penetration and Non-Conceptualism

Friday, 13 November 2026
4:15pm CET, 3:15pm GMT, 10:15am ET

Abstract: With strikingly few exceptions, philosophers have assumed that the objects of perception must be spatiotemporal particulars. Typically underlying this assumption is what I call the Sensation-Cognition Gap (“SCG”): the view that sensory and cognitive awareness are mutually exclusive, jointly exhaustive modes of awareness. For it is then claimed that because universals are abstract objects, they must be accessed via cognitive awareness, and since perception is a state of sensory awareness, universals cannot be accessed in perception. A notable exception to this orthodoxy was Edmund Husserl, who held that universals are given in “categorial intuitions” that somehow fuse perceptual and intellectual acts to present abstract objects phenomenally. Yet it remains unclear whether categorial intuitions are genuine perceptions and, if so, how they can present abstracta—it is unclear, that is, how Husserl challenges the SCG. I aim to do three things in this paper. First, I defend a novel analysis of categorial intuitions as what contemporary theorists call “cognitively penetrated” perceptual experiences—perceptions whose phenomenology has been altered by their subject’s cognitive states or abilities. Second, I argue that Husserl challenges the SCG by claiming that cognitively penetrated perceptions involve a sui generis, sensoricognitive mode of awareness that I call apprehensional awareness, which is a primitive act of awareness of which sensory and cognitive acts are dependent abstractions, not separable constituents. Third, I show that for Husserl, by abstracting the type-identical elements out of experiences of similar moments, one apprehends universals in cognitively penetrated perceptions. Against the scholarly consensus, I argue that Husserl takes the relevant acts of abstraction to be non-conceptual, and I defend his account against nominalistic objections.

Upcoming talks

Esther Neuhann (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Freie Universität Berlin)
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11 December 2026

Nicolai K. Knudsen (Aarhus University)
Shall We? Invitations, Equality, and the Routes to Joint Action
29 January 2027

Laura Gow (University of Liverpool)
Cognitive Phenomenology and Belief-discordant Behaviour
12 February 2027

Alfredo Tomasetta (IUSS Pavia)
Is Intentionality Phenomenal? A Debate in Classical Indian Philosophy
5 March 2027

Ali Kerem Eroglu (University of Liège)
Intentionalism without Retention: Brentano on Temporal Experience
9 April 2027

Minna-Kerttu Kekki (University of Helsinki)
Phenomenology of the State: From Edith Stein to the Present
7 May 2027

Convenors:
Guillaume Fréchette (University of Geneva)
Marta Jorba (Pompeu Fabra University)
Alessandro Salice (University College Cork)
Hamid Taieb (Humboldt University Berlin)
Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran (Philipps University Marburg)

Organized on behalf of the Network for Phenomenological Research