Next Talk of “Monthly Phenomenology”: Julio De Rizzo
Julio De Rizzo (University of Vienna) on ‘Husserl on Perceptual Experience (1894-1901)’. Friday, 25 April 2025. From the NPR.
MONTHLY PHENOMENOLOGY
An online forum of discussion on recent work in phenomenology
Description: This series of talks gathers together scholars interested in phenomenology and its relation to contemporary issues in philosophy, especially in the philosophy of mind. It establishes a forum of discussion where people can meet on a regular basis and present their work-in-progress or recent publications. The topics addressed will stretch from the history of early phenomenology to the systematic application of phenomenological insights in recent debates in analytic philosophy.
Schedule: The talks will take place once a month on a Friday from October to May. Time: 10:15am ET, 3:15pm GMT/GMT+1, 4:15pm CET. Talks last 90 minutes, including a 45 minutes Q&A.
Participation: Talks are held on zoom. To participate, please send an email to hamid.taieb@hu-berlin.de with the heading “Registration Monthly Phenomenology”. A zoom link will be sent to you the day preceding each talk.
Programme:
Next talk
Julio De Rizzo (University of Vienna)
Husserl on Perceptual Experience (1894-1901)
Friday, 25 April 2025
10:15am ET, 3:15pm GMT, 4:15pm CET
Abstract: In recent years, a debate has emerged over whether Husserl’s account of perceptual experience should be read as disjunctivist or conjunctivist. Scholars on both sides have offered strong textual evidence in support of their interpretations. In this talk, I focus on writings up to and including the first edition of the Logical Investigations, arguing that the ambivalence stems from systematic features of Husserl’s epistemology in his magnum opus. This tension mirrors a familiar issue in contemporary philosophy of perception: a pull in two opposing directions—on one side, the tendency to individuate perceptual states by their representational content; on the other, the influence of context-sensitive elements that support an externalist account. I suggest that Tyler Burge’s recent proposal of distinctive treatments of type and token states offers a promising framework for reconciling these tendencies. Moreover, I argue that this strategy not only proves useful in the contemporary context, but also finds support within Husserl’s own approach to perception and perceptual knowledge.
Upcoming talks
Maja Spener (University of Birmingham)
Introspective Methods in Early Experimental Psychology
9 May 2025
Convenors:
Guillaume Fréchette (University of Geneva)
Marta Jorba (Pompeu Fabra University)
Alessandro Salice (University College Cork)
Hamid Taieb (Humboldt University Berlin)
Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran (Philipps University Marburg)
Organized on behalf of the Network for Phenomenological Research